



**Statement by Ms. Marta Žiaková,
Chairperson of ENSREG,
following the Group's 48th meeting of 24 March 2022**

ENSREG's 48th meeting took place in a hybrid format, with both virtual and physical participation.

The Chair of ENSREG and both vice-Chairs were re-elected to serve a second term. The vice-Chairs' term will be shortened to one year to avoid replacement of all three senior positions at the same time.

ENSREG welcomed eight new Members (representing Austria, Czechia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia and two representing Spain). In addition, ENSREG welcomed new representatives of IAEA and Ukraine.

In the light of Belarus's complicity in Russia's aggression against Ukraine, ENSREG suspended Belarus's participation as observer in ENSREG until further notice.

The acting Chair of the Ukrainian nuclear regulator, SNRIU, updated ENSREG on the prevailing nuclear safety situation in UKR, and delivered the annexed statement. ENSREG members expressed their appreciation for the commitment of the SNRIU and its staff to ensuring nuclear safety in these circumstances and for continued exchange of information over the past few weeks. ENSREG Chair recalled the three statements ENSREG had issued on 28 February, 6 March and 10 March on the nuclear safety situation in Ukraine.

ENSREG Members noted that the IAEA initiative to conclude a framework agreement to ensure the safety and security of Ukraine's nuclear installations represents the best way forward for ensuring the safety of Ukraine's nuclear installations in the current war situation.

ENSREG also discussed SNRIU's request for guidance on how to carry out regulatory responsibilities:

- i) during military conflict,
- ii) after military conflict.

ENSREG agreed that the working group led by WENRA, with participation of Commission JRC experts, would be best placed to prepare such guidance.

ENSREG agreed to launch the public consultation phase of the second Topical Peer Review on fire protection: to this end, the drafts of the Technical Specifications, the Terms of Reference and the TPR-II Stakeholder Engagement Plan will be published on ENSREG's public website.

ENSREG agreed that the peer review of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant could be rescheduled due to changes in the project schedule. The desktop review phase will be completed mid-2022, while the site visit will now take place in mid-2023.

ENSREG approved, for publication on the ENSREG website, the latest status report on the implementation of post-Fukushima stress test national action plans.

ENSREG decided to include a session addressing the regulatory issues raised by the war in its 6th regulatory conference, which will be held on 20 and 21 June 2022, in view of the threats to nuclear safety posed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The next routine plenary meeting of ENSREG will be a half-day session, held on the 21st of June 2022, directly after the ENSREG Conference.

Annex

STATEMENT OF UKRAINE for the ENSREG meeting on 24 March 2022

Ukraine is one of the ten largest countries in the world in terms of nuclear energy use. As a country that has already paid a very high price for the Chornobyl disaster, Ukraine has been applying significant permanent efforts for decades to ensure the highest standards of nuclear and radiation safety and security. The results of those efforts are confirmed by the conclusions of many international missions, peer reviews, cooperation projects.

However, the conditions of the high safety standards of peaceful atom use have changed dramatically as a result of Russian Federation's full-scale military aggression against Ukraine.

As it is defined in the UN General Assembly resolutions of 2 March 2022 ES-11/1 "Aggression against Ukraine", Ukraine has been under a full-scale armed aggression launched by the Russian Federation.

Military seizure and destruction of nuclear installations has nothing to do with the assurance of the internationally recognized fundamental safety principles and requirements. It needs to be noted that Ukraine is no longer able to ensure Operator's compliance with the nuclear and radiation safety requirements and to ensure regulatory control. The SNRIU has analyzed the current status of compliance/uncompliance with the IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles and Safety Requirements in connection with the military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine (Analysis attached).

The operational personnel at the seized facilities are exhausted due to constant pressure from the Russian military. There is no possibility of normal rest because they or their relatives are actually at the gunpoint. The risk of human failure is catastrophically increasing.

The situation is constantly deteriorating due to the fact that the repair and maintenance work are not possible, and there are no possibilities to deliver spare parts, equipment and qualified specific maintenance and repair personnel to the site.

At the same time, the situation is deteriorating significantly due to the looting of nuclear installations equipment and materials by the Russian military.

It is necessary to act now because the delay can lead to serious consequences. The SNRIU calls for the immediate establishment of an effective mechanism to ensure nuclear and radiation safety in the country as a whole, and at seized facilities in particular.

Following the current deterioration of the situation the Ukraine strongly requests the ENSREG and all European community to provide us with their support of the Ukrainian position regarding the Framework agreement between IAEA and SNRIU on the safety and security of nuclear installation in Ukraine in particular that which affected by the armed aggression of Russian Federation against Ukraine.

Under these circumstances and taking into account that there is no precedence in the World history that nuclear installations and facilities of such scale like in Ukraine are under the condition of armed aggression and military actions, the urgent international assistance to Ukraine on the safety and security of nuclear installations and facilities in Ukraine shall meet the priority demands of the Ukrainian as follows:

- to establish and coordinate provision of all necessary means for a security zone around every Ukrainian NPP, where there should not be any military personnel, armaments or equipment;

- to demand that the representatives of the Russian Rosatom entity and its affiliates currently present at the occupied Ukrainian NPPs or any other nuclear installation or facility immediately leave the respective sites and hand over operational control over such sites to the Ukrainian officials and IAEA;
- to fulfill the IAEA assistance to Ukraine in implementation of its safeguards obligations under the Safeguards Agreement on all nuclear materials at the Ukrainian nuclear facilities currently occupied by the Russian Federation Armed Forces until the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine ends;
- to assist in securing a rotation of the Ukrainian operating staff at the occupied nuclear installations;
- to ensure that any national of the Russian Federation or the Republic of Belarus, including as an employee of the IAEA, shall not take any part in the decision-making, preparation or conduct of any IAEA or other international missions or services to Ukraine under current circumstances.

These priority demands ultimate fulfillment will be the only possible condition to allow the implementation of the further IAEA and other international parties Proposals for Assistance and Support Measures.