NUCLEAR TRANSPARENCY WATCH

Prevent and anticipate through transparency and participation

The influence of the bigger picture on technical LTO issues

The need for input from an EIA
The need for support for Espoo

ENSREG peer review process LTO
Brussels, 3 May 2018

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Essential questions

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Based on RL I1.1, within this technical specification, **ageing** is considered as a process by which the physical characteristics of a structure, system or component (SSC) change with time (ageing) or use (wear-out). A related topic in determining the safety of nuclear installations is obsolescence of SSCs, i.e. their becoming out of date in comparison with current knowledge, standards and technology. Obsolescence is viewed as a different issue that is not related to the plant items within the scope of the topical peer review. Obsolescence is therefore not included within the specification.

WENRA specifications exclude obsolescence
– fundamentally wrong

<u>Essential questions</u> concerning nuclear reactor ageing:

1. Is the overall risk of ageing reactors still considered acceptable – if not, what measures are necessary to bring them on an acceptable level?
2. Can operation of these reactors after their initial technical lifetime still be justified?

Initial technical life-time

Most citizens experience a nuclear power station as a risk.

They have accepted that risk for the time-span they knew: the initial technical life-time of 30 or 40 years.

The coming 10 years will see in the EU and EEA around 90 reactors reaching their initial technical life-time.

Decisions for longer operation are multi-layered.

Citizens have a natural legal, moral and logical right on a justification for facing that risk beyond the initial technical life-time, and to be consulted.

Risk status
of ageing nuclear reactors

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Influencing factors:

1. Changing insights about **risk** – same risk limitation as for new reactors → BAT, alternatives

2. Changes in the **physical environment** – changes in chance of impact, changes in magnitude of impact = change in risk

3. Changes in **energy economy** – availability of less risky alternatives → raises the bar for acceptable risk

Sufficient basis for justification prolonged operation?

What was acceptable in the initial operating license is mostly not acceptable today any longer.

Nuclear regulators are the custodian of that.

<u>For each assessment of national reports:</u>

Are proposals made in the framework of continuous improvement,
proposals based on lessons learned from Fukushima and other incidents,
sufficient to be able to justify, or not: **prolonged operation of ageing nuclear power stations**?

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Espoo Convention

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Espoo Convention: Obligation for EIA for life-time extension of nuclear power plants
(Rivne 1,2 findings Espoo Implementation Committee)

Obligatory EIA = golden opportunity to gain the information on the wider picture, needed for establishment acceptable risk

Espoo ad-hoc working group nuclear life-time extension

28 – 30 May 2018 – workshop, Geneve

NOT about nuclear safety

About the right of citizens to be consulted
About your right to receive the full picture

CALL on you as regulators

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1. Review your recommendations in this peer-review
   on the basis of risk levels that are informed
   by the wider picture of the world in which we now
   discuss ageing reactors;

2. Support the efforts under the Espoo Convention
and
   in the EU to have a full EIA carried out
   before you have to finalise your decisions
   that will lead to lifetime extension beyond the initial
   technical lifetime of ageing nuclear reactors.

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