



**6th ENSREG Conference
Extraordinary Session
Ukraine: nuclear safety in times of war**



Oleh Korikov


Acting Chairman of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine,
Acting Chief State Inspector on Nuclear and Radiation Safety



Current National Nuclear Programme



Current status (1/2)





Current status (2/2)



SNRIU NOW

Regulatory Requirements



ND (NP) – Normative document (Regulations)
ND (RD) – Regulatory Guide providing clarification and justification of the related requirements of NP


Zaporizhzhya NPP (1/2)

Zaporizhzhya NPP units are operated by the Ukrainian personnel according to the design and operational documentation (as far, as it is possible).



Zaporizhzhya NPP (2/2)

- Off-site emergency preparedness and response arrangements are not provided at the Zaporizhzhya NPP
- Currently only mobile phone and e-mails channels are available



SNRIU NOW


SNRIU activities

- State inspectors perform their functions, except for inspectors of the Zaporizhzhya NPP.
- Main activities regarding the Zaporizhzhya NPP – collection, analysis and review of the information.
- Validity of licenses are renewed until the end of martial law.



SNRIU staff issues

- Staff (partly) unable to get to the office (covid experience helped)
- Some personnel are at the army
- Some personnel in the occupied territories
- High stress
- TSO support



Core issues (conclusions)

- Authorisation: according to the legislation in case of martial law: the terms of consideration of application documents for licenses have been suspended; validity of licenses are extended until the end of martial law.
- Review and assessment: the function is performed;
- Inspections: significantly limited inspections (canceled scheduled inspections), inspections at the Zaporizhzhya NPP, are physically impossible.
- Emergency preparedness and response: the function is performed (except ZNPP).

Analysis

IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles

Can not be fulfilled under military actions circumstance:

- 1.3, 2.1
- Principle 1, bullets 3.6, 3.7
- 3.10 (Principle 2 partly)
- Principle 3, bullets 3.12, 3.13
- Principle 7
- 3.30, 3.31, 3.32 (Principle 8 partly)
- 3.34, 3.36, 3.37 (Principle 9 partly)
- Principle 10, bullet 3.39

Analysis

IAEA SSR-2/2 (Rev. 1)

Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation

The occupation of ZNPP made impossible to comply with requirements:

- Requirement 1 (3.2, c, d, e)
- Requirement 2 (3.5, 3.6, 3.7)
- Requirement 4 (3.12, 3.13)
- Requirement 6 (4.13)
- Requirement 7 (4.19, 4.20, 4.24)
- Requirement 9 (4.35)
- Requirement 11
- Requirement 14
- Requirement 17
- Requirement 18 (5.2, 5.7)
- Requirement 21 (5.20)
- Requirement 22 (5.21)
- Requirement 30 (7.28)

Analysis

The Seven Pillars

The physical integrity of the facilities – whether it is the reactors, fuel ponds, or radioactive waste stores – must be maintained;

All safety and security systems and equipment must be fully functional at all times;

The operating staff must be able to fulfil their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure;

There must be secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites;

There must be uninterrupted logistical supply chains and transportation to and from the sites;

There must be effective on-site and off-site radiation monitoring systems and emergency preparedness and response measures;

There must be reliable communications with the regulator and others.



Thank you!
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