



Irregularities and falsifications

Background and suggested improvements

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Commissionner




OUTLINE

- 1. Background : Technical EPR vessel head anomaly**
2. Irregularities and falsifications
3. What kind of improvements with regard to CSFI?

Flamanville 3 RPV anomalies

- Compliance with minimal mechanical properties required in acceptance tests zone (surface to be welded)




EPR 1650 MW reactor vessel



- Chemical and mechanical tests on a sample of the EPR reactor vessel head and bottom (late 2014, performed to address the risk of heterogeneity at ASN request)

- Results of Charpy test (impact energy) lower than codes and regulation values
- Attributed to the high carbon concentration in the sample resulting from the manufacturing process (large ingot)



Flamanville 3 RPV anomalies

New French regulation highlighted the risk of heterogeneities in the vessel heads



Technical anomaly

Identification of a zone with higher carbon content and lower mechanical properties than expected



Risk of brittle fracture

AREVA has to demonstrate the behavior of the vessel heads



- **Demonstration that the thermal-mechanical loads can't initiate the propagation of the biggest potential defect, not detected by NDT**


EPR 1650 MW reactor vessel



Flamanville 3 RPV anomalies



Same anomaly in other components ?



Review identified several SG bottom channel heads (2015)

Flamanville 3 RPV anomalies

- Manufactured by **Creusot Forge** and **Japan Casting & Forging Corp.** (18 PWR units in France)
- Charpy V-notch tests results (approximately 30J at 0°C) : no compliance with French regulation on a qualification component



Same anomaly in other components ?



Generic anomaly in the composition of the steel of heavy components : a **technical anomaly despite compliance with industrial codes and standards**, highlighted by the French regulation



Potentially international issue



Background : Technical EPR vessel head anomaly

**WENRA works on this issue (carbon heterogeneity)
in order to consider a potential recommendation**


1. On related **safety risks**,

- **licensees should** be encouraged to **identify the components concerned by carbon positive macro-segregation issue**, among those equipping operating reactors
- **licensees should** launch Investigations and **corrective actions to demonstrate** that components affected by carbon segregation are **safe** in operation

2. On **manufacturing processes**, licensees have to **monitor the manufacturing processes** that may cause a carbon segregation concern and therefore affect the mechanical properties of the products, especially the weight and type of ingots, the pouring process, the discard rate, the machining rate and the forging stages

3. On the **codes and regulation**, **action** should be taken on current **manufacturing codes or regulation** so that they **prevent** the risks due to residual carbon positive macro-segregation.

Flamanville 3 RPV anomalies



**Audit of manufacturing quality in Areva Creusot Forge plant
(2015)**



Same anomaly in other components ?

First audit limited in terms of period (between 2010-2014); out of the manufacturing period of FA3 vessel



At end of 2015, ASN requested to extend the period of the audit



OUTLINE

1. Background : Technical EPR vessel head anomaly
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3. What kind of improvements with regard to CSFI?

➤ Areva Creusot Forge (France) – 2016



- Irregularities detected concerning manufacturing parameters or test results


87 marked files

- inconsistencies
- modifications
- omissions in the production files

File archived by Le Creusot ≠ File transmitted to manufacturer, licensee, ASN

➔ **Irregularities of about 400 pieces** among 10 000, since 1965
(around 100 for French nuclear industry: SG, primary branch, transport packages)

➔ Main safety case for the lower shell of an SG in F



feedhead



		FICHE INCIDENT QUALITÉ QUALITY NOTIFICATION		N° d'affaire / Reference: 88571001	Document: FIQ 08 083	Rev.: 1	Page: 1/1
ORIGINE / Origin: <input type="checkbox"/> Fournisseur / Supplier <input type="checkbox"/> Client / Customer		Client / Customer: AREVA		Emetteur / Issuing:			
Matière / Material: 1.4 MDO		Identification / N° de coulée / Marking / Heat N°: Z 5433		Projet / Project: GV RB III		N° Cde Client / Client Order: 8857 1001	
Détection / description:		<input type="checkbox"/> Annexes / Annex		Désignation, pièce ou sous ensemble / Designation, part or subassembly: VIROLE basse 335		Stade de fabrication / Operation manufacturing stage: forgeage	
Date: 09/12/2008		Date: 09/12/2008		D1 CARACTERISTIQUE DE L'ECART / Description of the discrepancy:		Critères d'acceptation / Acceptance standard:	
		Impossibilité de couper la chute tête / longueur trop juste environ manque environ 400					
<input type="checkbox"/> SANS FNC / No NCR		D3 TRAITEMENT DE L'ECART / ACTIONS A ENTREPRENDRE / Treatment of the discrepancy / Actions to be performed:		Diffusion / Distribution:		<input type="checkbox"/> AQ <input type="checkbox"/> DT / MCQ <input type="checkbox"/> CQ <input type="checkbox"/> GP <input type="checkbox"/> CTRL <input type="checkbox"/> PROD	
		SOLUTIONS / ACTIONS A ENTREPRENDRE / Resolution / Actions to be performed:		Resp. / Person(s) in charge:			
		- Poursuivre la fabrication - Prevenir le CA lors du traçage pour déterminer les suites à donner.					



Irregularities and falsifications

New SG in Gravelines – ASN request to check files

- Irregularity discovered in a **unmarked** file
- Changes made to the results of mechanical tests on the upper shell



File archived by Le Creusot \neq **File transmitted to manufacturer, licensee, ASN**

File archived by Le Creusot

REPERE	SENS PRELEVEMENT	TEMPE	ENERGIE de RUPTURE (IMPACT ENERGY)			FIBROSITE DUCTILE	EXPANSION LATERALE
			JOULES				
ITEM	ORIENTATION	RATURE °C	IMPOSEE REQUIREDE	RESULTATS RESULTS	MOYENNE AVERAGE	FRACUTURE VERFORMUNG	EXPANSION SEITLICHE AUFDEHNUNG
NR	PROBENLAGE	TEMP	SOLLWERT	ERMITTELT	MITTELWERT	%	mm
Z5887							
VD1	Circonférentiel (Longitudinal)	0°C	≥ 80 Moy.	170	159	80	2,2
VD2	"	"	≥ 60 Indi.	139		50	1,8
VD3	"	"	"	167		75	2,1
AD1	Axial (Travers)	0°C	≥ 80 Moy.	42	83	5	0,7
AD2	"	"	≥ 60 Indi.	42		5	0,7
AD3	"	"	"	165		70	2,2

File transmitted

REPERE	SENS PRELEVEMENT	TEMPE	ENERGIE de RUPTURE (IMPACT ENERGY)			FIBROSITE DUCTILE	EXPANSION LATERALE
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VD2	"	"	≥ 60 Indi.	139		50	1.8
VD3	"	"	"	167		75	2.1
AD1	Axial (Travers)	0°C	≥ 80 Moy.	98	128	25	1.5
AD2	"	"	≥ 60 Indi.	120		40	1.7
AD3	"	"	"	165		70	2.2

2015 :

- Several cases of **nonconformance** in the products manufactured at Le Creusot
- ASN requests **inspections of past manufacturing products**, which exhibit **noncompliant** results



2016 : New inspections launched by AREVA

2017 : Full examination decided : 10000 files, 6000 of them in the nuclear field, 150 people dedicated to examinations

April 2016

Discovery of
« marked files »

July 2016

Discovery of
irregularities in
« unmarked files »


From September 2016

Full examination
process

Meanwhile, other CSFI cases

➤ Westinghouse - Mangiarotti (Italy) – November 2015

- Manufacture of heavy components (steam generators for EDF, AP1000...):
 - Concealment of the absence of the heat treatment on a gage block and attempt to transmit a falsified certificate on this block



➤ SBS Forge (France) – November 2015

- Forge specialized in ring rolling products:
 - Metallurgical reports had been falsified

		INDICE DE GROSSEUR DE GRAIN / Indication of the apparent grain size : 1-2 avec quelques grains de taille 0 / with some grain of size 0.
IMPOSITIONS / requirements : >2 (présence grains de taille 0 et 1 tolérée / presence grain of size 0 and 1 tolerated)		
RESULTATS (Si précisé à la commande) / Result (if clarified with order) : NON CONFORME / Not conform to spec Pour déclarer, ou non, la conformité à la spécification, il n'a pas été tenu explicitement compte de l'incertitude associée au résultat / To state or not the compliance with specification, it was not explicitly taken into account the uncertainty associated to the result.		
Observation(s) : -		
Date d'essai : 01/02/2013 Test date	Technicien de laboratoire : A. SABY Laboratory technician	
Approuvé, le : 07/02/2013 Approved on	Chef de service ou suppléant : Y. ROBERTY Department head or his deputy	
ACCREDITATION N° 1-2655 PORTÉE D'APPLICATION : ESSAIS SUR WWW.CSFI.CO.FR		

		INDICE DE GROSSEUR DE GRAIN / Indication of the apparent grain size : 3 avec quelques grains de taille 0 et 1 / with some grain of size 0 and 1.
IMPOSITIONS / requirements : >2 (présence grains de taille 0 et 1 tolérée / presence grain of size 0 and 1 tolerated)		
RESULTATS (Si précisé à la commande) / Result (if clarified with order) : CONFORME / Conform to spec Pour déclarer, ou non, la conformité à la spécification, il n'a pas été tenu explicitement compte de l'incertitude associée au résultat / To state or not the compliance with specification, it was not explicitly taken into account the uncertainty associated to the result.		
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* Taille de grains moyenne > 2 conforme
 G.L. 24.04.13



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3. **What kind of improvements with regard to CSFI?**

What kind of improvements with regard to CSFI?

CSFI as well observed
abroad


Controls based on
trust and openness
put into question

In 2015 and 2016,
falsifications
especially in pressure
equipments



- Need to adapt the **oversight processes** (internal and external)
- Need for an analysis of the **reasons for irregularities** in order to **adapt the monitoring system**

Analysis of the reasons for irregularities system



Dr Donald R. Cressey – Triangle fraud (1950)



Actions to adapt the monitoring system

What kind of improvements with regard to CSFI?

Information and notification

- Protection of whistle-blowers
- Encouraging the information to Regulatory bodies when knowing case of falsification
- Systematic analysis of alerts

Controls and tests

- Promoting automatic data transmission to foster integrity
- Increasing the controls and tests monitoring by agreed third party
- Requiring independent tests on samples coming from the manufacturer

Oversight and Inspections

- Suppliers inspections (whatever the level, abroad)
- Methodology to identify sensitive suppliers
- Making inspectors aware of the risk of fraud



➔ **Applicable to all actors (suppliers, customers, licensees, safety authorities)**