

HERCA-WENRA Approach


**for a better cross-border coordination of
protective actions during the early phase of a
nuclear accident**

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Outline

- **General European Context**
- **Cross Border Coordination of Protective Actions**
 - National EP&R Arrangements
 - Insufficient Information
- **European Level of Preparation**
- **Conclusion**


European Situation



A nuclear accident occurs in country A that affects the territories of neighbouring countries.

All countries are fully sovereign in organizing the emergency.

Possible Implementation of Protective Actions



Reason for Lack of Harmonisation

**National EP&R has been developed
across Europe without giving great
priority to cross-border issues**

Differences


- **Types of protective actions**
- **Criteria for intervention levels for introducing protective actions (in terms of projected dose)**
- **Operational intervention levels (action levels based on measurements)**
- **Methods for assessing source terms**
- **Methods for radiological impact assessment and dispersion modelling**
- **Definitions of emergency planning zones**

General Objective of the HERCA - WENRA Approach

**Coordination of response in the early phase
of an accident between the impacted
country with the aim of a coherent response
across borders**

**Approach jointly approved by HERCA and WENRA
on 21 October 2014**

How to harmonise?



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HERCA-WENRA Approach National EP&R Arrangements

- **Before an accident**
 - **Enhance mutual understanding**

- **In case of an accident**
 - **Early phase of an accident (first hours)**
Do the same as the country where the accident occurred
 - **Mid-term (after the first hours)**
Development of a common situation report

HERCA-WENRA Mechanism during the Early Phase

**The accident country should provide and update
information required to understanding
the situation**

**Neighbouring country uses the information to check
consistency of the response in the accident country**

**Neighbouring country aim at aligning
recommendations for decisions on protective actions
with accident country**

Continuation of Operational Work

- **Development of country fact sheets**
- **Development of guidance for bilateral or multilateral arrangements**
- **Develop a common understanding of key elements of the new EU-BSS**
- **Reduce differences through a coordinated transposition and a better application of international recommendations**

Special case of an extreme event with insufficient Information

- Knowledge of an extreme event or situation creating a risk of core melt and large radioactive release (extreme natural hazard, terrorist attack, ...)
- Lack of sufficient information to rely on the use the regular EP&R arrangements
- Necessity for the safety Authorities to decide and possibly recommend immediate and consistent protective actions to the relevant national Authorities

Evaluation of the Situation

- **Simplistic and robust decision making process and criteria**
- **Use of Judgment Evaluation Factors (“JEFs”)**
 1. Risk of core melt
 2. Containment integrity
 3. Wind direction

Evaluation of the Situation

JEF	Description	Possible values of JEF		
1	Is there a risk of core melt?	Yes	No	Unknown
2	Is the containment integrity maintained?	Yes	No	Unknown
3	Is the wind direction?	Steady	Variable	Unknown

Protective Actions

- **Protective actions considered**
 - Sheltering
 - Iodine Thyroid Blocking (ITB)
 - Evacuation
- **Other protective actions are not considered by the HERCA-WENRA Approach at this stage**

Potential Core Melt without Indication of Loss of Containment Integrity


Protective Action	Distance
Evacuation + ITB	up to 5 km
Sheltering + ITB	5 to 20 km

Sheltering is preferred against evacuation under the plume

Potential Core Melt with Indication of Loss of Containment Integrity

- **Extended protective actions would become necessary, such as**
 - Evacuation and ITB up to 20 km
 - Sheltering and ITB up to 100 km

Wind direction



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Harmonised Preparation of Protective Actions in Europe

- **Evacuation should be prepared up to 5 km around all nuclear power plants, and sheltering and ITB up to 20 km**
- **A general strategy should be defined in order to be able to extend evacuation up to 20 km and sheltering and ITB up to 100 km**
- **Radiation and nuclear safety Authorities should continue to promote compatible response arrangements and protection strategies in Europe**

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Main Outcome

- **Mechanism for cross border coordination of protective actions during the early phase of an accident, when national EP&R are operational**
- **Common position for response in the improbable case of a very severe accident with limited information and the need of fast decisions on protective measures**
- **Agreement on minimum preparedness arrangements (planning zones)**

Next Steps

- **HERCA-WENRA position is currently shared by radiation protection and safety Authorities only**
- **These Authorities are committed to engage discussion with their national Authorities in charge of Civil Protection, in view of the implementation of the HERCA-WENRA approach**