

From: Peer review team
Sent: 15 July 2013
To: NGOs
Subject: Final products of Taiwan stress tests peer review

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Thank you for your response and the interesting conversation. I think we have made our mandate clear, - and as far as I can see from our communication we essentially share a common understanding with the NGOs.

Let me respond to the open points arising from your previous email:

1) What are "well-founded" observations on which we intend to develop observations/recommendations on key strengths and key weaknesses? – Essentially I mean comprehensibility, i.e. our deliberations should be performed and presented in a way which is comprehensible with regard to the main statements included in the peer review report, i.e. built on deliberations referring to best practices in similar plants and circumstances.

2) We do pay a lot of respect to the Taiwanese legislators, but please keep in mind that our mandate comes from the Taiwanese regulator; therefore, our key project partner is the regulator who asked us to review one of his products, the national stress tests report. In addition, we link to other information sources in order to have a comprehensive spectrum of opinions on this report, - not least to the information coming from the NGOs.

3) Tangible and intangible added value: I fully understand your argument and share your concerns, but again our mandate consists essentially of assessing the comprehensibility, credibility, etc. of the key safety-related statements and conclusions of the national report. From this analysis we should then develop a set of recommendations with regard to strengths and weaknesses. Strengths and weaknesses can be developed by comparing the procedures, techniques, data, measures etc. mentioned in the national report to the ones in similar plants and circumstances (international "best practices"). As rich experience from post Fukushima safety improvement programs (and, in some cases, of course also from relevant pre-Fukushima programs) provides sufficient evidence and experience in order to be able to compare to the situation in a specific plant or country. On this basis, the national regulator could then develop a set of concrete (tangible) improvement measures; - the last step is, however, not in our mandate anymore and strictly left to national responsibility and accountability.

Last not least, as safety (or quality) is a continuous process, we certainly agree that no peer review as well as no safety (or quality) assessment can ever provide a "final safety seal" (or final quality label), only a snapshot of the prevailing situation under given circumstances. This is, however, most useful in order to be reasonably sure that international best practices are taken into account. The safety assessment and the quality assessment world are quite similar in that sense, as you impressively described.

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